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Action-at-a-distance is a generic property of physical theories. As such, it is not a
fruitful idea in theory building. Its absence confers a rigidity on a theory which we
exemplify through analysis of long-range correlations of the EPR-type in relativistic
theories. Rigidity is desirable for fundamental theories, and theory building should focus
on structurally unstable properties, making action-at-a-distance a side issue. Though
apparent superluminal effects seem to be present in many present-day physical theories,
we maintain that they are not a basis for action-at-a-distance.
1. Introduction
Ever since the famous EPR debate [1, 2], there has been widespread speculations
that long range quantum correlations are indication of some sort of action-at-a-
distance. The situation is extremely subtle and the presence or absence of action-
at-a-distance depends a lot on philosophical concerns [3], though many physicist
would deny this. We do not want to enter this debate. The purpose of this essay is
to expound the consequences of the existence of these correlations, in the peculiar
way that they manifest themselves, concerning possible physical theories. Whether
these theories are to be of an action-at-a-distance type or not, is something that
depends on the details, interpretations, and conceptual content of the theories. The
information we shall convey is to a large extent independent of all this, and so must
be heeded by all interested in this debate.
2. Metatheory of Superluminal Communication
Although the light cone has been considered an impenetrable barrier, much of
present-day physics, based on this impenetrability, actually predicts a variety of
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phenomena that seem to bridge the gap between the subluminal and superlumi-
nal. Even plain classical Maxwell electrodynamics has superluminal solutions [4].
Quantum gravity effects allow for light to propagate outside the gravitational “light
cone” calling into question just what is the exact causal structure of space-time [5].
Extremely general quantum field theoretic considerations seem to imply superlumi-
nal influences [6]. These examples can be multiplied many-fold. Effects seem to slip
across the light cone in spite of a firm theoretic resolve to contain them. This fact
alone is remarkable given the wide variety of theories for which this happens, and
some general characteristic, unsuspected up to now, could probably be discovered
to explain it. In any case, one need not be surprised that a widespread debate con-
tinues. A good portion of this debate seems to exist on the fringe of main-stream
physics, in obscure journals and on the internet, and one should ask why.
What is needed of course is some way of proceeding without entering the details
of particular theories. Superluminal situations arise out of details. What is not
clear is their effect on life as we live it. Is it action-at-a-distance? This depends
on many conceptual subtleties. Can one send a message? This is more straight-
forward. Can I hold a conversation with my relative on a Mars colony with each
remark followed immediately by a response as in a normal living-room conversation,
not suffering the usual speed-of-light time delay? Will we both agree, upon meeting
each other two years later, that each one indeed said what the other remembered?
These are uncontestable gross effects. This is much like machinery, wheels turning,
lights flashing, and bar-room shouting. What one needs to establish is whether
the superluminal effects implicit in present-day main-stream physics can have this
“gross thermodynamic quality” or are they just peculiar properties of the theoret-
ical apparatus which do not lead to the gross effects that are needed. The firm
belief, almost faith, on part of the majority of “working physicists” that the sec-
ond alternative is the truth, contributes to keeping a portion of this debate mostly
on the fringe. The situation has not been helped by an abundance of arguments
based on a faulty or partial understanding of modern physics and that are then
easily if not trivially put down, often accompanied by vehement arguments by the
proponent that this was not done. In a way this is reminiscent of the abundance
in centuries past of proposals for perpetual motion, before a true understanding of
thermodynamics was achieved.
Nick Herbert [7] for instance proposed an arrangement that would duplicate a
photon state through stimulated emission. Superluminal communication is then
easily achieved. This proposal quickly provoked various rebuttals [8, 9, 10] to the
effect that no linear state transformer can clone a quantum state, an instance of the
so called “No Cloning Theorem”. Stimulated emission simply does not work the
way the proponent assumed it does, an assumption that implied non-linearities in
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quantum mechanics of a type never observed.
The argument that in the EPR situation no superluminal communication is
possible [11, 12, 13, 14] is that the statistical behavior of any detector placed on
one arm of an EPR apparatus is completely independent of what is done on the
other arm. Thus even though action-at-a-distance may be present as part of the
“hidden gears of nature” that do indeed spin on the microscopic scale, our access
to these processes, it is claimed, is such that we cannot create gross quality effects.
Some dispute this last claim, but none have yet built a working device. In what way
should the EPR situation be considered action-at-a-distance even though no energy
or matter is transferred in any way, is to be left to the philosophically inclined [3].
We do not wish to deny the value of philosophical analysis, but call attention to the
fact that the action-at-a-distance debate has forced upon us a level of philosophical
subtlety usually absent in physical discourse. One does not need to enter such
realms as much can still be done with more directly physical considerations.
Superluminal communication and action-at-a-distance are not logically equiva-
lent, but of course closely related. The hidden-gears-of-nature position shows that
one could maintain action-at-a-distance without producing gross quality effects, but
discounting direct transfer of information to the receiver’s mind (and only in certain
theories of the mind at that), it’s hard to see how one can receive a distant signal
without the sender “acting” upon a physical entity that manifests the signal. The
scientific merit of a hidden-gears-of-nature posture is dubious, and by action-at-a-
distance we shall mean a gross quality one, and so we treat action-at-a-distance and
superluminal communication as being about the same thing.
One cannot discount relativity. If we simply deny universality of special relativ-
ity then the debate becomes fruitless as no new guiding principle is brought forth to
substitute the supremely powerful one that was discarded. As a local (space-time
tangent-plane) symmetry, special relativity has been borne out with great precision.
One cannot furthermore discount cosmology, as gross quality superluminal effects
would surely, one expects, have profound effects on the structure of the universe.
One could suppose that relativity is not universally valid, and that there is a
privileged frame, roughly, for instance, that of isotropic background cosmic radiation
or that of isotropic galactic red-shifts, which is sensed by some processes and with
respect to which instantaneous action-at-a-distance is possible. Any such theory
would have no causality problems, would alleviate some of the paradoxical features
of the abundant apparent superluminal effects, and could probably be stretched to
fit the known facts, but conceptually and fundamentally would be very different
from the current one. In the end a theory must be judged by experiment. Until
then one should inquire if the tension resulting from stretching it to fit the facts is
greater or not than the one in the current theory.
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To make some headway into this complicated business, one can, instead of
searching for theories that allow action-at-a-distance and then stretching them to
make them hang on the known physical facts, take the inverse approach. Postulate
a principle that disallows gross quality action-at-a-distance effects, something akin
to the second law of thermodynamics, and see what this means for possible physical
theories.
A useful notion is that of theory space. Consider all possible physical theories,
or to be less vague, all possible physical theories of a given type. One can conceive
of a type of topology on this space given by proximity of predicted results. To dispel
some of the aetherial quality of this, consider a large set of descriptions of exper-
imental arrangements, each with a finite number of possible outcomes. A theory
is then a function that associates to each description the probability distributions
of the outcomes. The set of all such functions is then the theory space, and the
topology may well be the weak topology, that is, one for which a neighborhood is
defined by proximity of the prediction of probability of a finite number of events.
This approach is very akin to the “empirical logic” approach pioneered by Foulis
and Randall [15]. Many questions concerning the space of theories can be precisely
formulated and investigated in this manner.
Present day physical theory is a point in this space. It is surrounded by the-
ories that are proximate in experimental predictions but that may well be radi-
cally different in other aspects. One is interested mainly in a weak neighborhood
of the present-day theory as any serious alternative theory must agree with well-
established results predicted by the present-day theory. The relevant concept now
is that of structural stability. Do all neighboring theories share a property of the
present-day theory or not? If not, how big, in an appropriate sense, is the set
of neighboring theories that do? One has to work with some technical notion of
“almost all”. Topologically this could be “dense” or “second category”. We say a
property is structurally unstable if almost all theories in a neighborhood violate it,
and structurally stable if almost all share it. Structural instability, in spite of this
weak-sounding designation, is a sign of a strong fundamental theory as one then
has sufficient reason to differentiate it from neighboring ones.
What emerges from metatheoretic studies is strong evidence toward the claim
that, first of all, Lorentz covariance, the existence of self-subsisting physical states,
and the existence of enough EPR-type long-range correlations, practically charac-
terize present-day linear quantum theory, and second, that the absence of gross
quality superluminal effects is structurally unstable, that is, almost all theories in
the neighborhood of present day physics allow superluminal communication. The
first hypothesis almost certainly can be replaced by general covariance of general
relativity, the other two will be explained in the course of this essay. The struc-
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tural instability explains many facts. One is a sociological one. Why is there
an abundance of proposals of superluminal signaling devices based on present-day
physics? First of all, the abundance of apparent superluminal effects in a variety
of physical theories, pointed out at the beginning, means that many will stumble
upon at least one of them, and so be induced to believe that such a device may
be possible. Second, the slightest misunderstanding of present-day physics, or the
slightest miscalculation within it, places one at a neighboring theory and then it’s
practically inevitable that one will conclude that superluminal communication is
really possible. The argument may seem watertight as the most subtlest of errors
will be enough to lead to the conclusion. Another fact is the great robustness of
present-day theories. Serious alternatives seem to run up against insurmountable
difficulties. Thus Weinberg’s non-linear quantum theory was abandoned by its cre-
ator exactly because he could not formulate a relativistic version [16]. One now
understands why he failed.
What do we mean by “self-subsisting physical states”? In quantum theory
(in the Schro¨dinger picture), a physical state evolves deterministically by a unitary
group in Hilbert space. Such a state is generally created at some time and destroyed
later in a measurement process, but the deterministic evolution can be extended
to both temporal infinities. In particular it can be extended to a time before its
creation, which means it could have been created at an earlier time and in some
other place. Likewise the evolution can be extended to a time after its destruction,
which means it could have been subjected to measurement at a later time and in
different place. The state is thus an autonomous physical entity having no memory
of its birth nor any prescience of its demise. Regardless of the ontological status
of such entities, physical theories use them as algorithmic devices to compute joint
probabilities of observed events. A sequence of events is then seen as the interaction
of a state with a measurement apparatus (or something akin to it) by which the
state is modified and then evolves until the next interaction when it suffers another
modification followed by another evolution, and so on. Thus joint probabilities of
events are computed using the interpolating existence of evolving self-subsisting
entities. This is not a logically necessary picture. One can take the strange sound-
ing position that physical states are not really necessary to do physics, as one can
conceive of ways of calculating joint probabilities without the use of such interpo-
lating entities. In fact certain patterns of probabilities cannot be interpreted this
way. The “consistent histories” approach to quantum mechanics [18, 19] in fact
abolishes to a large extent the reliance on self-subsisting physical states and can
easily produce examples [18] where joint probabilities cannot be explained by such.
Such an approach also suggests [17] that the obstruction to relativistic non-linear
quantum mechanics, so lamented by Weinberg [16], can be overcome.
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To begin our analysis [20], we work with the hypothesis that there may be some
physical processes that do not conform to usual quantum mechanics but that these
only take place in very particular situations, whereas for the vast majority of other
situations, such as experiments done up to now, any deviation from normal quantum
mechanical predictions is imperceptible. One could thus posit a photon cloner that
acts in a non-linear fashion, and that it can take part in an experiment in which
normal quantum mechanics is adequate for processes not involving it. Explicitly one
assumes that, in any given inertial frame, up to the use of an unconventional device,
the usual quantum mechanical reasoning can be used, including the projection rule.
Up to such a moment, ordinary quantum mechanics determines what the physical
state is. At the point of using the unconventional device one of course must explicitly
say what would happen (a photon would be cloned in the above cited example).
What one succeeds in showing under these hypotheses is that certain types of de-
viations, specifically non-linearities and lack of true randomness of outcomes, allow
for superluminal signals. This makes ordinary quantum mechanics a structurally
unstable theory in relation to the property of not allowing superluminal communi-
cation. This is important as many proponents of modifications to ordinary quantum
mechanics are in fact implicitly assuming our hypotheses and so face a real risk of
coming into conflict with relativity, assuming the existence of superluminal com-
munication is such a conflict.
More explicitly, [20] shows that, given our hypotheses, 1) in a Hilbert space of
dimension at least three, any state transformer, including temporal evolution, must
be given by a linear transformation of density matrices, 2) if a state transformer
takes pure states into pure states and has at least two states in its range, it can
be implemented either by a linear or an anti-linear operator, and 3) randomness of
possible outcomes in one experiment implies randomness of outcomes in all.
It must be emphasized, as was mentioned before, that the above assumptions
are about formalism and not about interpretation. What is postulated is an altered
formalism associated to what is generally known as the Copenhagen interpretation,
but no interpretational hypotheses are made. State collapse is used, but no as-
sumption as to its ontological nature is made, only that it’s a legitimate calculating
device for joint probabilities. What the results say is that joint probabilities cannot
be calculated by certain rules if superluminal communication is to be ruled out.
It should also be noted that part of our understanding about the standard for-
malism is that it’s capable of giving account of a relativistically covariant theory.
This is not straightforwardly obvious given the instantaneous nature of wave func-
tion collapse [21, 22], but this does not preclude lorentz covariance of observable
quantities. What the standard formalism lacks is thus manifest covariance while
being able to provide for covariance of measurable magnitudes. It’s precisely this
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fact that makes the theory structurally unstable, for a perturbation in the formalism
is likely to make the manifest non-covariance capable of producing real effects, such
as superluminal communication. In fact all theories that incorporate any frame-
dependent notions, such as temporal evolution, and which have no gross quality
superluminal effect can probably be interpreted as a “hidden gears of nature” the-
ory. A small change in the theory can expose the hidden gears and make them
accessible to our manipulation and so superluminal communication becomes pos-
sible. A recipe for constructing a superluminal signaling device is generally very
easy to discover in any such modified theory, for instance, Gisin [23] has done it
explicitly for Weinberg’s non-linear quantum mechanics.
There is also an argument that relates the absence of gross quality superluminal
effects and the second law of thermodynamics showing that under certain hypothe-
ses, which include special relativity, superluminal communication can be used to foil
the second law of thermodynamics. This is because with superluminal communica-
tion, information can flow backward in time. One can then foresee details of normal
thermodynamic fluctuations and take advantage of them to extract work from heat.
This points out the thermodynamic character of any action-at-a-distance proposal
within special relativity, a connection that was also pointed out by Elitzur [24].
A striking feature of the above conclusions is their generality. This in fact
throws doubt on the emphasis given to superluminal communication and makes
one suspect a more fundamental tension in alternate theories. In fact, the presence
of superluminal signals as they emerge from the analysis, per se already contradicts
relativity. Consider a superluminal signaling device making use of the “exposed”
state-collapse mechanism and that is to operate between two distant locations in the
reference frame of two observers at relative rest. According to the general results, if
the first observer invokes the signaling process, then the second observer will, after
a negligible time interval, detect it. We can say that for the second observer the
onset of the signal is practically simultaneous with the initiating event. Onset is a
physical event and so all observers ought to agree where in space-time it occurred.
Consider how the same situation is seen in a reference frame of a moving observer.
He would see a different initial state, find that his physics is described by possibly
different deviant equations, but, assuming relativity, he does all his reckoning in
relation to his plane of simultaneity. The argument that leads to superluminal
signals is sufficiently general that the moving observer will also expect these to
exist, but now in relation to his plane of simultaneity, and so he would expect the
onset of the signal along the second observer’s world-line to be significantly different
from what was determined before. Since onset is an uncontestable physical fact,
this is a contradiction. The sheer generality of the results leads us to seek a more
fundamental viewpoint from which lack of superluminal communication would be
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a consequence and not a hypothesis, much as one supplants thermodynamics with
statistical mechanics and derives the second law from more basic principles.
The above problem arises because of the dubious mixture of special relativity
with self-subsisting physical states that undergo change in measurement situations.
Consider a measurement with space-like separated instrumental events such as a
correlation measurement of the EPR type. In one frame the measurements on
the two parts are simultaneous and so can be considered as just parts of a single
measurement, while in another frame the two measurements are successive with
intervening time evolution. These two description must be equivalent and produce
the same observable results. Thus relativity imposes constraints that relate the
measurement process to the evolution. These constraints are structurally unstable
and neighboring theories are almost all inconsistent with relativity.
In another study [25], we explore the nature of these constraints in a relativistic
quantum logic framework. This was already presaged in [20] where it was found
that the absence of gross quality superluminal effects can be used as supporting
argument for assuming certain axioms in the foundations of quantum mechanics
thus suggesting that quantum mechanics owes some of its aspects to space-time
structure.
Without going into the details, the axiomatic approach posits a system of propo-
sitions concerning outcomes of experiments performed in regions of space-time sub-
ject to (beyond some standard quantum-logical impositions) four crucial ingredients:
1) Lorentz covariance, 2) state transformation due to measurements, taking pure
states into pure states, 3) causality, and 4) something called “covariance of ob-
jectivity”. The second ingredient is an appropriate generalization of the projection
postulate, the so called “collapse of the wave function”. Depending only on the state
and the measurement arrangement, it incorporates the basic idea of self-subsisting
physical states as interpolating entities used in calculating joint probabilities of ex-
perimental outcomes. The third ingredient posits that experimental arrangements
in space-like separated regions are compatible in the technical sense of quantum
logic, a generalization of the commutativity of observables in standard quantum
theory. The fourth ingredient is a technical elaboration of Lorentz covariance that
is needed due to the presence of the self-subsisting physical states, as these are frame
dependent entities (they interpolate measurement events in a temporal sequence,
which can be frame dependent). What the postulate basically means is that if one
observer identifies a mixed state as arising from a measurement process in his causal
past with unknown outcomes, and attributes to it a decomposition into pure com-
ponents on the basis of objective correlations, then another such observer would
make the same attributions using the appropriate Lorentz transformed objects.
What results from this analysis is that the joint probabilities of outcomes from
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space-like separated experiments must satisfy an explicit constraint. This constraint
already precludes the use of long range correlations for superluminal communica-
tions, along the same line of reasoning as in standard quantum mechanics, but this
not too surprising as one has strong causality ingredients in the axioms. What is
more interesting is that if these constraints were to be extended to measurement
situation which are no longer space-like but which are still performed with com-
patible instruments, then one could deduce the famous “covering law” of Piron’s
axiomatic quantum theory [26], from which a Hilbert space model (not necessarily
with a complex base field) for the proposition system follows.
It seems at first hand that there is no way to bridge the barrier between the space-
like and time-like compatible arrangements. The presence of enough long-range
correlations however can do it. Suppose you want to study right-hand circularly
polarized photons. One way is to simply put an appropriate filter in front of a
light source and those photons that get through are of the right kind and so can be
observed at will. Another equivalent way is to set up an EPR-type arrangement that
creates singlet two-photon states with the individual photons flying off in opposite
directions. Put now the same filter on the distant arm of the EPR apparatus
and nothing on the near arm. Observe at will. Half of the photons observed are
right-hand circularly polarized and half are in the orthogonal left-hand circularly
polarized state, and as the measurements are done, there is no way of knowing which
is which. If all one wants however is analysis of experimental outcomes, this is no
problem, just wait enough time that the results (passage through the filter or not)
at the distant arm of each photon pair are available (typical correlation experiment
situation) and simply throw out all the experimental data for the instances where
the distant photon did not pass through the filter. This provides you with data now
of just the right-hand circularly polarized photons at the near arm. The fact that
these two experimental procedures are equivalent is a feature of ordinary quantum
mechanics and depends on the existence of a particular entangled state, the two-
photon singlet.
In the general axiomatic analysis, if one postulates an analogous equivalence
principle, that to any time-like experimental arrangement with compatible instru-
ments, there is an equivalent space-like arrangement performed on an appropriate
long-range correlated states, then one completes the argument toward the covering
law and a Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics.
Instead of being simple inconsequential curiosities, as some have maintained,
long-range correlations may be instrumental in making physics what it is. They
provide the link between space-time structure and mechanics and a bridge between
the superluminal and the subluminal. Why such a bridge should exist cannot be
answered at this level of analysis. A more appropriate scenario would probably be
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quantum gravity, where the light cone, and consequently the distinction between
superluminal and subluminal, are emergent concepts and don’t exist at the fun-
damental level. Apparently the physically relevant solutions for our universe are
such that gross quality superluminal situations are suppressed. This should emerge
as a feature of such a theory and not a fundamental ingredient, much as quark
confinement is a feature of certain gauge theories.
3. Conclusions
What can be conclude from all of the above considerations? In the first place,
it’s remarkable, as was mentioned in the beginning, that apparent superluminal
effects have been pointed out in such a wide variety of theories that ostensibly are
relativistic and causal. This cannot be a coincidence and some general characteristic
must be at work. A theory of any complexity about space-time situations may just
easily contain logical implications between propositions concerning situations in
space-like separated regions, which then may be perceived as having to do with
gross quality superluminal effects. A superluminally propagating classical solution
of Maxwell’s equations [4], certainly seems to be a harbinger of such effects. These
perceptions are clearly part of what is happening, but it probably is not the full
story, and the situation certainly bears further study.
If gross quality superluminal effects are found experimentally, this most likely
would radically transform our ideas about the world. Experiments should of course
be performed, but the question then is where to search for these effects. The above
mentioned apparent superluminal situations in existing theories seems a natural
start, but the situation seems so general that it’s hard to imagine that some of
these are just apparent and others truly lead to gross quality situations. If all are
capable of producing gross quality effects, it’s strange that no irrefutable exper-
imental evidence has up to now been forthcoming. It’s also unlikely that causal
physics is a mathematical inconsistency. The sheer generality of the situations ar-
gues against them. In the end it seem likely that all these effects are apparent and
any experimental attempt based on them to be frustrated.
Another conclusions is that action-at-a-distance is a “soft”, that is, a struc-
turally stable concept. In any formalization of the space of all theories it would be
characterized by a set of inequalities (the presence of a non-zero effect) which would
be maintained by any small change in the theory. As such it’s present in almost any
theory one can devise. By the same token, perception of its possibility in almost any
type of theory should be widespread. Its absence is a structurally unstable concept.
Fundamental theories that are to be taken seriously should be structurally unstable
in relation to its fundamental characterizing properties. Otherwise there would not
be sufficient reason to distinguish them from any neighboring theory. Weinberg [16]
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argues repeatedly and eloquently for the importance of theory rigidity and in this
we agree with him.
Taking this into account, advocacy of action-at-a-distance, is per se basically
counterproductive. It does not point us to a new fundamental theory. It may be
that a new fundamental theory that supplants the present one would have action-
at-a-distance as one of its features, but the new theory would not be characterized
by this, but by a new rigid set of properties.
References
1. Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. and Rosen, N., Physical Review , 47, 777 (1935).
2. Bohr, N. Physical Review , 48, 696 (1935).
3. d’Espagnat, B. Foundations of Physics, 11, 205 (1981).
4. Rodrigues, W. A. Jr. and Maiorino, J. E. physics/9710030 and references therein.
5. Konstantinov, M. Yu. gr-qc/9810019 and references therein.
6. Hegerfeldt, G. C. quant-ph/9809030 and references therein.
7. Herbert, N., Foundations of Physics , 12, 1171 (1982).
8. Dieks, D., Physics Letters A, 92, 271 (1982).
9. Milonni, P. W. and Hardies, M. L., Physics Letters A, 92, 321 (1982).
10. Wootters, W. K. and Zurek, W. H., Nature, 299, 802 (1982).
11. Eberhard, P. H., Nuovo Cimento B , 38, 75 (1977).
12. Eberhard, P. H., Nuovo Cimento B , 46, 392 (1978).
13. Ghirardi, G. C. and Weber, T., Lettere Nuovo Cimento, 26, 599 (1979).
14. Ghirardi, G. C., Rimini, A. and Weber, T., Lettere Nuovo Cimento /, 27, 293 (1980).
15. There is a vast literature concerning this, which space does not allow us to cite here. See
for instance Foulis, D. J. Journal of Natural Geometry , 13, 1, (1998) and references
therein.
16. Weinberg, S., Dreams of a Final Theory , Vintage Books (1992). See pp. 88–89 for
the discussion on the failure of relativistic nonlinear quantum theory.
17. Svetlichny, G. “On Relativistic Non-linear QuantumMechanics” in M. Shkil, A. Nikitin,
V. Boyko, eds, Proceedings of the Second International Conference “Symmetry in
Nonlinear Mathematical Physics. Memorial Prof. W. Fushchych Conference”,
Institute of Mathematics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, 1997.
18. Hartle, J. B., “Spacetime Quantum Mechanics and the Quantum Mechanics of Space-
time”, in 1992 Les Houches Ecole d’e´te´, Gravitation et Quantifications
19. Omne´s, R., The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press,
(1994)
20. Svetlichny, G., Foundations of Physics , 28, 131, (1998).
21. Aharonov, Y. and Albert, D., Physical Review D , 24, 359 (1981).
22. Aharonov, Y. and Albert, D., Physical Review D , 29, 228 (1984).
23. Gisin, N., Physics Letters A, 143, 1 (1990).
24. Elitzur, A. C., Physics Letters A, 167, 335 (1992).
25. Svetlichny, G. “Lorentz Covariance and the Covering Law”, pre-print MAT.15/95,
Mathematics Department, Pontif´ıicia Universidade Cato´lica of Rio de Janeiro. To ap-
pear in a revised version in 1999.
26. Piron, C., Foundations of Quantum Physics , W. A. Benjamin, Inc., London (1976).
